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HAS THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ PUT DUE PROCESS ON 
THE STAND? WHY THE ECJ’S APPROACH IN KADI II 
SHOULD BE USED ACROSS THE ATLANTIC  
PATRICK LEISURE1 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) struck a balance between due process rights and national 
security in the Kadi II case. Applying the ECJ’s analysis to a case recently decided by the D.C. 
District Court – the Zaidan case – illustrates that a more rights-protective approach can be 
attained in US courts too. First, this article will explore due process in Europe via the four 
different versions of the Kadi case. Then, it will take an in-depth look at the Zaidan case. The 
article concludes by arguing that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals should adopt a stance on 
due process similar to that taken by the ECJ in the Kadi II case – which served to uphold the 
rule of law in Europe by making the actions of public officials reviewable before EU courts in 
the counter-terrorism context. By exercising a more ‘muscular’ attitude towards the other branches 
of government’s counter-terrorism measures, the US judiciary might use this case to start a new 
line of precedent distinct from prior US cases with respect to US citizens’ constitutional rights in 
the post 9/11 counter-terrorism paradigm. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Two journalists recently brought a case before the D.C. District Court alleging that the US 
government has placed their names on the kill list without giving them any prior notice or 
an opportunity to challenge their inclusion therein.2 One of those journalists is an American 
citizen. The allegation has put the meaning of due process, the US military’s fight against 
terrorism, and the scope of national security measures to the test. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit 
Court should take the case as an opportunity to reaffirm the Constitution of the United 
States’ protection of due process and uphold the rule of law by making actions of public 
officials reviewable before the courts, particularly when fundamental rights are under threat. 
The Kadi II case – in which the highest European Court upheld the ability of an EU citizen 
to challenge their inclusion on a terrorism blacklist – provides an effective modus operandi for 
this analysis. By illustrating what form a more rights-protective compromise between “the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the protection of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the persons concerned”3 would take in the US, the Kadi II case exemplifies 
an equilibrium between security and due process. Furthermore, the more rights-friendly 
approach of the ECJ is particularly applicable in Zaidan v. Trump given the grave liberty 
interest at stake – the journalist’s life. 
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2 EU COURTS, DUE PROCESS, AND TERRORISM 
2.1 THE KADI SAGA  
The discussion of due process as it relates to terrorism has largely played out in the European 
Union via the so-called ‘Kadi Saga’.4 Mr. Yassin Kadi founded an organization which acted 
as a charity and part of Osama bin Laden’s fundraising network in the 1990s.5 After 9/11, 
Mr. Kadi was placed on a terrorism blacklist by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
and his assets were frozen.6 Security Council Resolution 1267 was transposed into EU 
legislation pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 which allowed for Mr. Kadi 
to challenge the regulation (after exhausting domestic remedies) in EU courts. In 2005, the 
General Court of the European Union found that they could not review the EU Regulation 
since such a review would entail an evaluation of the UNSC measure.7 The General Court 
simply looked at whether the UNSC had respected jus cogens norms of international law; 
ultimately, the Court found that the UNSC had met this minimum requirement and therefore 
ruled that Mr. Kadi’s inclusion on the blacklist was legal.8 
On appeal, the European Court of Justice rejected the approach taken by the General 
Court. The ECJ decided that it could review the legality of the EU Regulation—though this 
was not equivalent to reviewing a Security Council measure’s legality – because fundamental 
rights “form the very basis of Union’s legal order.”9 Upon reviewing the case, the ECJ found 
in 2008 that Kadi’s right to be heard, right to effective judicial review and right to property 
had been infringed because he had not been informed of the grounds for why he was on the 
list and therefore had never been able to seek judicial review.10 Following the judgment, the 
Security Council began publishing a ‘summary of reasons’ for inclusion on the terrorist 
blacklist. Thereafter, Kadi was provided an opportunity to be heard before the Commission 
again froze his assets.11 
In 2010, the General Court heard Kadi’s next challenge to Regulation No. 881/2002, 
which was newly amended to comply with the ECJ’s 2008 ruling. The General Court in Kadi 
II found that the summary of reasons was not sufficient to vindicate Kadi’s rights of 
defense.12 A summary of reasons was not adequate to effectively allow for a challenge of the 
allegations made against him, in part because there was effectively no real possibility of 
altering the UNSC’s finding.13 The Court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the 
Security Council had created an independent Ombudsperson in 2009 who would, if the 
petitioner was refused removal from the blacklist, state the reasons why – provided they were 
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not confidential.14 The role of the Ombudsperson was ostensibly “to guarantee fair 
proceedings and transparent standards to analyse information on the individuals concerned 
consistently and objectively.”15 Although the office of the Ombudsperson might be 
considered a “quasi-judicial role… her role has not attained the quality of a court of law.”16 
Therefore, Mr. Kadi’s due process rights were vindicated neither by the summary of reasons 
nor the creation of the office of the Ombudsperson. 
 On appeal, the ECJ in 2013 upheld the ruling of the General Court in finding that 
“the procedures provided for Kadi to appeal his listing by the United Nations in Europe 
were insufficient to meet European Union standards.”17 While the ruling was hugely debated 
for its confirmation of the General Court’s evaluation of the place of EU law in the 
international legal order,18 due process was also a large part of the decision and it is that 
aspect of the decision that will be explored further for its relevance to the Zaidan case. 
2.2 DUE PROCESS AND KADI II 
The European Court of Justice’s counter-terrorism due process standard in the Kadi II 
decision includes three elements: a procedural notice and hearing requirement, an evidentiary 
burden shift and a balancing between national security and the ‘rights of defense.’ Together, 
these three elements establish a minimum standard for due process, but also establish a 
powerful role for the EU courts in setting the “maximum” amount of due process required. 
The ECJ’s decision clarifies what these elements include. 
In order to meet the first element, the person who has been subject to a deprivation 
must have access to both the decision taken against them and the reasons underpinning that 
decision.19 This baseline requirement is meant to allow the person who has been subject to a 
deprivation to determine the reasons relied upon in the decision taken against them. The 
ECJ in Kadi II upheld the General Court’s ruling that “(t)he principle of effective judicial 
protection had been infringed… since Mr Kadi was afforded no proper access to the 
information and evidence used against him.”20 In essence, the ECJ must have enough 
information to make sure that the decision was taken with “a sufficiently solid factual basis.”21 
As such, the ECJ makes it clear that a verification by the EU Courts can include a review of 
the factual allegations included in the ‘summary of reasons’ given to the person on the 
terrorism blacklist upon which their listing is based. The result being that the EU Courts, 
when reviewing a counter-terrorism decision taken by another branch of the EU quasi-
federal government, must find that at least one of the reasons relied upon in the blacklist 
placement is substantiated.22 
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In the second element, the ECJ clarifies that the ‘rights of defense’ places the burden 
of producing evidence confirming the claims against the persons subject to a deprivation on 
the accuser.23 This means that, once the prospective terrorist brings a challenge to their 
listing, the burden shifts to the authority which has taken an adverse decision against the 
individual to establish that the reasons relied upon are well-founded.24 It is not the duty of 
the individual making the challenge to produce evidence in the negative that they should not 
be listed. To this end, the EU Courts can request that authority to produce information or 
evidence that is necessary to make this finding, even if that information is confidential.25 
Third, the ECJ provides for a limitation on the rights of defense by holding that there 
must be a balance struck between security interests and fundamental rights. Importantly 
though, the ECJ makes it clear that this balancing act is the job of the Court, not the authority 
which has taken an adverse decision against an EU citizen. The balancing act includes four 
elements. First, the ECJ held that if the authority deems that it cannot comply with the EU 
Court’s request for access to evidence and information, then it is “the duty of those Courts 
to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them.”26 Second, 
the Court found that if the evidence or information that is disclosed by the authority is 
“insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European 
Union shall disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or 
maintain a listing.”27 Third, the ECJ stated that it can assess whether a “failure to disclose 
confidential information to the person concerned and his consequential inability to submit 
his observations on them are such as to affect the probative value of the confidential 
evidence.”28 Finally, the ECJ held that in the event that the reasons for not disclosing 
information to the accused before the Courts are valid, then it is nonetheless “necessary to 
strike an appropriate balance between the requirements attached to the right to effective 
judicial protection, in particular respect for the principle of an adversarial process, and those 
flowing from the security of the European Union.”29 Therefore, the Kadi II judgment 
introduces a model under which the courts still have an important role to play in upholding 
due process for those listed as terrorists, even when security interests and confidential 
information are at play. 
 
3 ZAIDAN V. TRUMP: NEW FACTS NECESSITATE N EW 
APPROACHES 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF CASE 
The novel factual scenario presented in a recent case before the D.C. District Court has 
ushered in a debate over the US counter-terrorism regime’s relationships with due process.30 
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Two journalists—Mr. Kareem and Mr. Zaidan—brought a suit against the President and 
various heads of US executive branch agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Justice (DOJ), among 
others, alleging that their names are on a list of individuals that the US has labeled as terrorists 
and can be killed. Because Mr. Kareem is an American citizen and Mr. Zaidan is not, his case 
offers a different analysis with respect to his constitutional due process rights. The analysis 
will therefore focus solely on Mr. Kareem. 
Mr. Kareem states that he is a journalist for various news organizations including the 
BBC, CNN and al-Jazeera.31 He alleges that he has no association with Al-Qaida or the 
Taliban or any other terrorist organization.32 However, by virtue of Mr. Kareem’s line of 
work, he has extensively investigated and reported on terrorism on the ground in the Middle 
East. During a three month period in 2016, Mr. Kareem contends that he was subject to 5 
near-miss aerial strikes while he was reporting in Syria.33 In one event, the strike hit the exact 
location where Mr. Kareem was set to have an interview; he is still alive because he had 
climbed a nearby hill to get a viewpoint.34 In another, a vehicle in which Mr. Kareem was 
traveling was destroyed by a drone-fired hellfire missile of the type used by the US military; 
it was only because he was sitting in a nearby vehicle at the time of the strike that he was not 
killed.35 The other three incidents are equally as astonishing. As a result of these incidents, 
Mr. Kareem alleges that he was the intended target of these attacks and he is on the US 
government’s kill list.36 
The so-called kill list certainly exists.37 Former President Barack Obama issued a 
Presidential Policy Guidance in 2013 which outlined guidelines and accountability for 
inclusion of individuals on the list.38 Part of this guidance also includes information on how 
an individual might be put on the list using only metadata.39 It also includes the necessary 
preconditions for taking lethal action. Mr. Kareem alleges that the Defendants violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act by adding his name to the kill list despite the fact that he does 
not meet the conditions in the Presidential Policy Guidance.40 Specifically, Mr. Kareem 
brings forward six counts. Of those, two deal with due process. First, Mr. Kareem argues 
that his due process has been violated because he was given no notice or opportunity to 
challenge his inclusion on the kill list. Second, he argues that inclusion on such a list is an 
illegal seizure and “seeks to deprive him of life without due process of law.”41 The other 
claims range from a grave breech of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
constituting a war crime, to an excess of the authority of the Executive pursuant to the 
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), to a violation of the first amendment by 
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effect.42 Importantly, the US takes a broad approach under international humanitarian law 
with respect to targeted killings, taking the position that “all that is needed to target an 
individual is sufficiently reliable information that the person is a member of the organized 
armed group (Taliban, al Qaeda, associated forces).”43 However, by Mr. Kareem’s account – 
which the government has not responded to – he has no connection to any armed group 
falling within the purview of the AUMF. 
3.2 GOVERNMENT’S FIRST MOTION TO DISMISS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE 
PROCESS ASPECTS ARE JUSTICIABLE  
The US government filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Syria is a war zone where 
forces from multiple countries are fighting.44 Thus, the government argues that Mr. Kareem 
has done nothing other than show that he is a journalist reporting from a dangerous place. 
The D.C. District Court found that the evidence Mr. Kareem brought forward made it more 
than “a sheer possibility” that he was on the kill list.45 In other words, while he could have 
been targeted by Syria for reporting on anti-Assad work, he could just as plausibly have been 
targeted by the US. Next, the Court did not accept the government’s sovereign immunity 
defense because the government “fail(ed) to demonstrate at this point that the challenged 
action took place in the field in time of war.”46 Finally, the Court rejected the government’s 
political question doctrine claim and distinguished the case from al-Aulaqi I and II – in which 
a US citizen was targeted and killed as a member of Al-Qaeda with no trial–in three important 
ways. First, whereas al-Aulaqi was very far from the forum which would have heard his case, 
Mr. Kareem has come before the forum himself; much of the relevant information is in fact 
in the United States.47 Second, in al-Aulaqi II, the case was dropped because the judge (the 
same one hearing Mr. Zaidan’s case) refused to extend the Bivens liability theory into new 
territory.48 Here, Mr. Zaidan’s case is not based on a Bivens theory of liability. Finally, unlike 
al-Aulaki’s case, there has been no allegation or information of Mr. Zaidan being involved in 
terrorist activity. 
3.3 DUE PROCESS: LOFTY RHETORIC OR MUSCULAR JUDICIAL REVIEW?  
The D.C. District Court’s treatment of the due process issues seemed robust in the first 
ruling on the motion to dismiss. Citing Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua, the Court 
points out the fact that due process rights are justiciable even if they implicate foreign policy 
decisions.49 The Court emphasized the grave nature of the liberty interest here, Mr. Kareem’s 
life, in its discussion of both government accountability as well as securing individual 
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liberties. The Court proclaimed, “Due Process is not merely an old and dusty procedural 
obligation required by Robert’s Rules. Instead, it is a living, breathing concept that protects 
U.S. persons from overreaching government action even, perhaps, on an occasion of war.”50 
These are strong words coming from the bench, regardless of one’s take on prior anti-
terrorism due process court cases in the United States. 
At the same time, the Court’s extensive citation of Hamdi51 is somewhat troubling. 
Hamdi was used in conjunction with Mathews v. Eldridge52 extensively in the DOJ’s Memo on 
the government’s authority to use lethal force against al-Aulaki, also a US citizen.53 Thus, the 
D.C. District Court cited a wide array of cases that have come before the US Supreme Court 
and the D.C. Circuit dealing with due process and terrorism. The key question then, having 
cited various precedent, is what now exactly is the US judiciary’s stance? Is it, as Italian legal 
scholar Federico Fabbrini has argued, back to strong institutional balancing after 
Boumedienne,54 or was the US judiciary’s due process stance in the counter-terrorism realm 
always deferential and vague as argued by US legal scholar Jules Lobels?55 Moreover, have 
the most recent cases like Doe v. Mathis56 changed the standard to be applied to the unique 
facts in Zaidan, where a US citizen has allegedly been placed on a kill list in the context of 
simply fulfilling his work duties? In the ruling on the first motion to dismiss, the Court seems 
to be reaching for whatever it can grasp hold of as its due process alarm bells ring. In saying, 
“now that he has made it to a U.S. court…his constitutional rights as a citizen must be 
recognized…constitutional questions are the bread and butter of the federal judiciary”57, the 
D.C. District court seems to be standing up to the Executive branch in the tripartite balance 
that makes up the US federal government.  
3.4 SECOND RULING ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS—MILITARY AND STATE 
SECRETS PRIVILEGE  
On January 30th, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss claiming the state secrets 
privilege.58 The government claims that because the case “directly implicate(s) classified 
national security information pertaining to military and intelligence activities… it is apparent 
that litigating any aspect of this case requires the disclosure of highly sensitive national 
security information concerning alleged military and intelligence actions overseas.”59 The 
government argues that four types of evidence would come out from such a case: whether 
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59 ibid.   
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the US lethally targets people outside the US, the DOD’s use of lethal targeting in ongoing 
operations in Syria, whether Mr. Kareem has been designated for the use of lethal force, and 
whether the government has information about Mr. Kareem.60 On September 24th, 2019, the 
D.C. District Court upheld the motion to dismiss, citing the “utmost deference” standard 
courts apply when evaluating a claim of government claim of state secrets.61  The case has 
been appealed and will be heard before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the coming 
months.62  
The state secrets privilege “performs a function of constitutional significance” by 
allowing the Executive “to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and 
foreign-affairs responsibilities.”63 In 2005, several scholars conducted a study and claimed 
that there had never been a case “where courts have forced the government to disclose 
agency-held classified information in any case in which the privilege has been asserted.”64 
However, “like antiterrorist agencies, courts need information if they are to do their job 
properly.”65 The Zaidan case provides a factual scenario worthy of breaking that streak. On 
appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court should uphold Mr. Kareem’s due process rights, thereby 
establishing a new precedent – distinguished from prior terrorism due process cases – which 
reigns in the state secrets doctrine and reasserts a more ‘muscular role’66 of the judiciary in 
assuring US citizens’ due process rights in the ‘war on terror’. Taking stock of the Kadi II 
case in Europe would provide guidance to the D.C. Circuit on how to do this while balancing 
the need for confidentiality in the security realm.  
4 APPLICATION OF KADI II’S DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS IN 
THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT  
4.1 WHY IS KADI II PERTINENT TO THE ZAIDAN CASE? 
The ECJ’s treatment of due process in Kadi II is pertinent to Mr. Kareem’s case for four 
reasons. First, there has been no case like that of Mr. Kareem yet in the United States; while 
Kadi’s case was different in some respects, a European perspective on asset freezing is 
illuminating on the due process questions related to terrorist lists. Second, because there is 
no adequate precedent in the US, there is a danger of addressing the issue using attempts to 
balance the process due with factual scenarios inapplicable here. For example, Hamdi was 
mentioned some six times in the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel memo on the legality of 
using lethal force against a US citizen despite the fact that that case dealt with detention in 
Guantanamo and entailed a different liberty interest as well as a different territorial analysis.67 
While the alleged inclusion of Mr. Zaidan on the kill list presents a different liberty interest 
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to Mr. Kadi’s property deprivation, the fact remains that they were both subject to 
deprivations, resulting from their alleged inclusion on a list, by government entities. The due 
process analysis with respect to that listing is therefore analogous. Third, the state secrets 
doctrine has come under intense legal fire post 9/11.68 In Europe, the conversation that 
occurred from 2005-2013 surrounding the series of Kadi cases is particularly didactic in the 
US context because of its more recent application of the balancing of security and 
fundamental rights. Whereas the applicable standard in the US still dates back to 1953,69 the 
‘Kadi saga’ took place post 9/11. Finally, the ECJ’s treatment of due process rights in the 
context of terrorism blacklists was stronger than that seen in US District Courts,70 an 
approach which is in fact more apt in Mr. Kareem’s case given the more grave liberty interest 
– Mr. Kareem’s life – at stake.   
4.2 WHAT PROCESS IS DUE? 
As outlined in section four above, Kadi II presented a three-pronged analysis of due process: 
the baseline right of access and reasons, an evidentiary burden shift and finally a judicial 
balancing of liberty and security. However, it is important to note that Mr. Kareem’s starting 
point is slightly different than that of Mr. Kadi. While Mr. Kadi had for sure been subject to a 
deprivation, ie his placement on the asset freeze list, Mr. Kareem has alleged a deprivation 
based on his own provided evidence. Nonetheless, according to the European Court of 
Justice, due process has already kicked in. In Kadi II, the Court required disclosure so that an 
individual can be in a position to defend their rights and to decide whether there is reason to 
bring an action at all. The procedural requirement of due process can be seen with two lenses: 
the right to obtain information and the right to impart information.71 In other words, there 
is a notice requirement and a hearing requirement.72 In Mr. Kareem’s case, he has forced the 
first requirement by utilizing the second requirement. By coming to the Court and utilizing 
his right to be heard, he has put the issue of his right to notice to the test.  
Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights elucidates what the right to good 
administration entails. In that article, “the right of every person to have access to their file” 
is framed as a baseline right, which can be tempered when there is a need for “respecting the 
legitimate interests of confidentiality.”73 Thus, access to information comes first and 
confidentiality comes second. The US does not have a similar article; however, the principle 
case concerning access to information that allegedly includes state secrets is Reynolds74 – in 
which the widows of three civilians sued the federal government after a military plane, 
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supposedly carrying secret electronic equipment, crashed.75 The Reynolds case in fact found 
an equilibrium between access and confidentiality not vastly unlike that protected by Article 
41 of the EU Charter. “The standards of Reynolds…achieve a balance that allows claims to 
be adjudicated, and not be dismissed at the outset, while still protecting state secrets.”76 
However, as cogently illustrated by US scholar Carrie Newton Lyons, since the Reynolds 
decision, lower courts have deviated from the Reynolds standard. Circuit courts have started 
using an “utmost deference” standard towards the government’s invocation of the privilege, 
which was in fact never mentioned in Reynolds.77  Moreover, a 4th Circuit decision branched 
off further from the Supreme Court’s Reynold’s decision by holding that some “secrets are so 
central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten 
disclosure of the privileged matter”78; therefore the case must be entirely thrown out. On the 
contrary, Reynolds allowed the case to go forward, but without the excluded information. 
These two standards are exactly what the D.C. District Court used to dismiss Mr. Kareem’s 
case. Thus, the D.C. District Court’s second ruling, granting the motion to dismiss on state 
secrets grounds, is not only a departure from the applicable US Supreme Court jurisprudence 
in Reynolds, but also stands in stark contrast to the more rights-friendly approach to good 
administration outlined in Article 41 and clarified in Kadi, which frames access to 
information as a minimum floor to be balanced against the necessity for certain information 
to remain confidential.  
The second prong of Kadi II’s due process discussion related to the evidentiary burden. 
Kadi II held that once an individual subject to a deprivation has challenged their listing, the 
burden then shifts to the entity which has placed them on the list to bring forward evidence 
establishing the reasons relied upon in the listing. Importantly, the burden shift in Mr. 
Kareem’s case has already happened because Mr. Kareem has brought the challenge. While 
he may or may not be listed on the kill list, he has already been subject to a deprivation in 
needing to bring his claim – thereby spending resources and time to protect his alleged listing 
in addition to feasibly halting his reporting work – to put himself in a position to defend his 
rights. In other words, by showing up before a Court in the US, Mr. Kareem is pressing the 
government to either arrest him if it believes he is involved in criminal terrorist activity and 
undergo the full judicial process involved therein, or, contest the challenge with arguments 
that there was either no deprivation involved (ie he is not on the kill list) or that the 
deprivation was justified.  
In the D.C. District Court’s ruling, however, the Court primarily focused on Mr. 
Kareem’s arguments for why the State Secret’s doctrine should not apply. Essentially, the 
Court applied the wrong burden standard under the Kadi II framework. The burden must be 
on the party with access to the information to prove that the reasons relied upon are justified; 
none of the arguments the government mentioned would pass muster. First, access to the 
information would not allow Mr. Kareem to “evade attack or capture.”79 He has already 
shown up before the Court willingly. If the government has information relating to his 
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alleged terrorist involvement, they can arrest him and press criminal charges. Second, it is 
well-known that the kill list already exists.80 Therefore, disclosure of whether Mr. Kareem is 
on the list will not, on its own, harm national security efforts. Finally, the Presidential Policy 
Guidance from 2013 already publicly stated how individuals would be targeted for lethal and 
non-lethal force.81 Thus, the government’s final argument does not hold water because such 
information is known; even if it would harm national security, the case could still move 
forward while keeping that information confidential. As Reynolds held, “the decision to rule 
out the documents is the decision of the judge, and it is the judge who controls the trial – 
not the Executive.”82 Crucially, not only is the D.C. District Court’s analysis against the more 
rights-protective burden-shifting standard outlined in Kadi II, it also shoots wide of the mark 
set by Reynolds in which the Supreme Court clarified that once a showing of strong necessity 
is made, the Court must balance that showing with the appropriateness of the government’s 
invocation of the privilege. Satisfying these two requirements outlined in Kadi II – the notice 
and hearing requirement and the burden shift away from the party which brought the claim 
– would go a long way towards vindicating Mr. Kareem’s baseline due process rights. The 
Court’s remaining task is a balancing act between information that must remain confidential 
to preserve national security and the need to uphold constitutional guarantees of due process.  
4.3 THE BALANCING ACT: STATE SECRETS AND PRESERVING 
CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY MATTERS 
The balancing approach adopted by the ECJ in Kadi II is similar to the approach normatively 
postulated by US Supreme Court Justice Breyer.83 It demonstrates that the need to protect 
state secrets, which are central to national security, and the need to protect constitutional 
guarantees of the rule of law are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, because "the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"84, courts do not need to 
defer entirely in the state secrets realm to the other branches of government. Similarly, as 
stated by Koen Lenaerts in the EU, “considerations relating to international peace and 
security may not, as such, render decisions imposing restrictive measures upon named 
persons and entities immune from judicial review. Those considerations are not “political 
questions” outside the scope of such review.”85 Rather, EU Courts must perform their 
function of guarantors of the rule of law as outlined in Article 19 TEU.86 A balancing act, 
particularly in a case like Mr. Kareem’s, is achievable. Kadi II provides a due process model 
which is effective in the context of a US citizen alleging placement on the kill list because the 
judgement delineates how courts can achieve the balance between security and due process 
rights. This analysis will assert that the D.C. Circuit Court, on appeal, should adopt an 
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approach akin to Kadi II for Zaidan v. Trump and therefore establish that approach as a 
precedent for balancing due process and national security interests in future situations. 
 In Kadi II, recognizing that overriding considerations might bar the release of certain 
information or evidence, the judgment affirmed that it is still the Court’s duty to guarantee 
respect for procedural rights. In this vein, the task of the ECJ is to utilize ‘techniques of 
accommodation’ regarding both the nature and sources of information sought.87 Courts have 
a number of resources at their disposal to ensure confidentiality. While the United States 
system of discovery is unique in the world for both its breadth and control by the parties88, 
this does not mean that judges cannot play a more active role under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to protect confidentiality in the courtroom. For example, US Courts can 
name special masters over discovery in complex cases89 or use counsel with security-
clearances.90 In short, courts have options at their disposal to preserve confidentiality in 
exceptional circumstances.  
Kadi II ruled that in the event that confidential information cannot be released, the 
Court can still rule on the case. The Court must simply base their decision only on the 
material which it has before it.91 A similar standard could be used in the US. In the event that 
all but a very small portion of the information remains confidential as state secrets, the US 
judiciary can still make a ruling based on the information which is deemed not a threat to 
national security. This allows the judiciary to uphold the due process clause in the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments while not releasing information fundamental to security. Such an 
approach necessarily makes the government think carefully about what information is vital 
to state security and what information the Court needs to undertake a balancing analysis. A 
piecemeal approach of granting, for example, injunctive relief in individual cases where too 
little information is available would clarify where the evidentiary line is without harming 
national security. In Mr. Kareem’s case, in the absence of any information from the 
government, the court could have enjoined the government from including Mr. Kareem on 
the kill list in the negative until the government puts Mr. Kareem in a position to defend his 
rights. Importantly, this would still be an incredibly narrow ruling that would not give rise to 
heaps of new litigation. Where an American citizen has presented plausible facts on which 
an alleged attempted capital deprivation has taken place on numerous occasions, a court has 
a role to play in ensuring that the executive has not unnecessarily deprived the individual of 
their constitutional rights.  
Under Kadi’s due process standard, the D.C. District Court could have also disregarded 
reasons for Mr. Kareem’s inclusion on the kill list if they were not well-founded. This raises 
the evidentiary requirement and means that Mr. Kareem’s placement on the kill list, if he 
even is on the kill list, must be bolstered by reasons that are justifiable. This prevents the 
government from depriving citizens of rights by making claims without any information to 
back up such assertions. Kadi II’s balance between security and due process means that when 
the government fails to disclose information behind a reason for the listing, the accused’s 
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corresponding right to respond to allegations made against him can be considered by the court 
in assessing the reason for the listing. Therefore, Mr. Kareem’s due process rights are not 
fully met once he has access to whether he is included on the list and the reasons for such 
inclusion. Courts can still exercise review by basing their decision on information available, 
by deciding whether the reasons are well-founded, and by making extrapolations from the 
government’s failure to disclose information about the probative value of the evidence. In 
that respect, the Kadi II case provides a model in which courts, even if they must preclude 
information to respect security interests, can still uphold the rights of defense and respect 
for the adversarial process.  
 Such a balancing act, while difficult, is a necessary part of the judiciary’s role. As the 
D.C. Circuit has stated, “the Executive’s power to conduct foreign relations free from the 
unwarranted supervision of the Judiciary cannot give the Executive carte blanche to trample 
the most fundamental liberty and property rights of this country’s citizenry.”92 Courts are the 
best suited to balance competing fundamental interests. The European Court of Justice has 
balanced competing fundamental rights with fundamental freedoms in a number of cases.93 
In those cases, the Court balanced the rights to allow them to exist alongside each other, 
sometimes in competition, but never to the other’s complete dearth. It is time that courts in 
the US began to follow suit and contribute to an effective ‘war on terror’ that does not 
continually put due process on the stand.  
5 CONCLUSION 
Counter-terrorism measures and state security do not fundamentally need to change the way 
the law operates. In the United States, constitutionally protected due process rights have 
tended to yield to the Executive’s Article II powers. The degree to which US Courts have 
unquestioningly accepted state secrets claims in the security realm lends credence to this 
trend. However, in Europe, the debate which occurred between 2005 and 2013 under the 
four versions of the Kadi case led to a different conclusion. Balancing due process rights 
with recognized security interests in the context of terrorist lists can be achieved without 
compromising the integrity of either security or fundamental rights. In the US, the fact that 
Mr. Kareem is a US citizen and allegedly has no connection to any terrorist organization 
presents a rare factual scenario under which the US courts should look towards the Kadi II 
model for guidance on how to balance due process concerns with the protection of security. 
Under this model, the D.C. District Court should have upheld the baseline administrative 
due process element of access to whether Mr. Kareem was on the kill list and, if so, the 
reasons behind his listing. As Mr. Kareem has brought the case challenging his listing, the 
burden to provide evidence confirming or denying the alleged deprivation shifts to the 
government. Finally, the D.C. Circuit Court should apply a balancing analysis similar to that 
in Kadi II, thereby establishing a narrow but important precedent for future terrorism cases 
under which US citizens can vindicate their due process rights while balancing important 
national security interests. 
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